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Extensible applications rely upon user-supplied, untrusted modules to extend their func-
tionality.  To remain reliable, applications must isolate themselves from user modules.  
One method places each user module in a separate address space (process), which uses 
hardware virtual memory support to isolate the user process.  Costly inter-process com-
munication, however, prohibits frequent communication between the application and 
the untrusted module.  We implemented and analyzed a software method for isolating an 
application from user modules.  The technique uses a single address space.  We provide 
a logical address space and per-module access to system resources for each module.  
Our software technique is a two-step process.  First, we augment a module’s code so 
that it cannot access any address outside of an assigned range.  Second, we prevent the 
module from using system calls to access resources outside of its fault domain.
This method for software isolation has two particular advantages over processes.  First, 
for frequently communicating modules, we significantly reduce context switch time.  
Thus, we demonstrate near-optimal inter-module communication using software fault 
isolation. Second, our software-based techniques provide an efficient and expedient 

















  - an address space and a set of inter-fault domain calls.  A 
module assigned to a fault domain cannot directly access any resource 




 - a collection of functions permitted to access any address 






 a  trusted module that owns, and exists in, a fault domain.  A 
host module provides the runtime assistance needed to load, initialize, 




 - a module that contains a set of functions with defined 
entry points.  The implementations are not trusted, so they are restricted 




  - same as fault domain, except the address space is 
allocated to it by the operating system, which uses a memory manage-




  - the saving of the current context and a subsequent 
switch to another logical fault domain.  This context switch does not 







An extensible application (trusted host) can load and execute untrusted, 
user modules at runtime.  Faults caused by an untrusted module should 
not halt or otherwise corrupt the host.  To isolate faults between a host 
and a user module, operating systems provide fault domains, such as pro-
cesses.  Processes use separate address spaces to create fault domains. 
The host and an untrusted module communicate using various forms of 
inter-process communication.  Unfortunately, both processes and inter-
process communication consume significant resources for frequent com-
munication.  In addition, some operating systems (such as MacOS) do 
not provide separate address spaces.  Recent trends to modularize soft-
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ware in both industry and academia have prompted the need for efficient 
fault isolation.
Extensible operating systems import user modules into the kernel to 
improve performance and extend functionality [engler:exokernel, ber-
shad:spin, osdi:panel].  The goal is to simultaneously increase perfor-
mance and allow modularity while keeping the host (kernel) isolated 
from the module.  For example, some kernels can import small user mod-
ules to efficiently dispatch packets as they arrive from networking hard-
ware [mccaine:packet].  To maintain the reliability of the kernel, these 
packet filters are interpreted.  Software fault isolation could allow these 
packet filters to be translated to native code and execute in a separate log-
ical fault domain [wahbe:sbfi].  More ambitious systems, such as the 
SPIN operating system, allow user modules to aggressively extend the 
kernel [bershad:spin].  Security and reliability is maintained by the use of 
special compilers and type-safe languages at the cost of speed and plat-
form and language neutrality.  
In industry, the World Wide Web, despite its plethora of security prob-
lems, is taking the world by storm [hpp:blackw].  Untrusted modules 
such as Java Applets are currently fault isolated through interpretation of 
type-safe bytecodes [colusa:omniware, hpp:blackw, gosling:java].  To 
increase the speed of an applet it may be necessary to translate it to native 
code [adl-t:omnimobile].  Once the applet is executing in native code, it 
must execute in an isolated environment to protect the browser from the 
applet.  
 
2.2 Introduction to Software-Based Fault Isolation
 





modules at run time needs to create an environment in which untrusted 
modules can run efficiently.  In addition to good performance, untrusted 
modules must not interfere or otherwise corrupt the host module.  This 




  from 
its host. A fault is caused when an illegal action is performed (e.g., access 
to a forbidden resource).
The classic method of isolating two domains uses hardware assisted vir-
tual memory and UNIX processes (hereafter referred to as processes) to 
create separate address spaces and separate resource permissions on a 
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module or vice versa, some form of inter-domain communication is used.  
Pipes or remote procedure calls (RPC) are the most common [birrel:rpc].
Using multiple processes for multiple untrusted modules often yields 
unacceptable performance for frequently communicating modules, due to 
the high cost of inter-process communication and context switches.  In 
addition, inter-process control transfer which is inherent in most process 
communication, does not necessarily scale with a processor’s integer per-
formance [wahbe:sfi].  The cost of an RPC for frequently communicating 
domains is prohibitive.  An RPC requires: copying arguments from caller 
to callee, a trap into the kernel, a context switch, copying the return 
value, and another context switch.  Even the fastest RPC is several orders 
of magnitude slower than a function call [bershad:lrpc].
In this paper, we explore recent methods for creating and maintaining 
software-enforced fault domains [wahbe:sfi].  We remove the require-
ment for separate address spaces by creating logical fault domains within 
a single address space provided by a single process.  
On a UNIX-like operating system, two sets of resources need to be pro-










module.  The idea is to restrict a module to a set of valid 
addresses assigned to the fault domain.  Since all other resources (besides 
CPU utilization) are accessed through system calls, per-domain access to 
















 provide access to files and other devices.  












 through access controlling functions.  
On other platforms various CPU specific instructions must also be pro-
tected.  For example, on a 68000 running MacOS, both the A-line and F-
line exception handlers must be rerouted through an access controlling 
function.  A-line and F-line instructions provide access to operating sys-
tem services [moto:68k].  
Multiple fault domains existing in one address space allows for near-opti-
mal RPC performance.  An RPC is a transfer of control from one fault 
domain to another.  In the process model RPC performance is bound by 
resources consumed by context-switching, marshalling the arguments 
from one address space to the the other, and system calling.  Under the 
single process model, an RPC requires only the time to copy arguments, 
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and to set up the lighter software-enforced fault context.  We reduce the 





In this section we describe the concepts behind software fault isolation 




To protect memory we must determine a general technique for restricting 





  with an additional sequence of instructions to check the tar-
get effective address.  An unsafe instruction is a load, branch, or store 
whose target address cannot be determined before runtime.  For example, 
program-counter (PC) relative addresses can be verified at compile time.  
In contrast, arbitrary jumps, like returns from functions cannot be verified 
at compile time.  Thus, the inserted code checks to see that the target 
address is within the segment.  If not, a fault is generated.   Consider 
Figure 1 to be part of an untrusted module.  The goal of the technique is 
to prevent the instruction from reading memory outside of its designated 
segment.  Depending on the desired level of isolation and performance, 
we can chose not to check the target address of loads.  In our implemen-




Pseudo code for an unsafe instruction. Since we cannot determine the address 
contained by r0 at runtime, this instruction is unsafe.
(1)  load r2, (r0) ; load contents of memory address r0 into r2
 
In Figure 2 the general prefix sequence is shown.  The “trap” pseudo-
instruction is a system dependent action.  In most UNIX implementa-
tions, the “trap” would most likely send a signal to the untrusted module 














Pseudo code for isolating an address in software.  We prefix the instruction in line (3) 
because it is unsafe.  Line (3) will not execute unless it passes the legality check in line 
(1).  
(1)  legal = check r0     ; is r2 in this fault domain
(2)  trap if (not legal)  ; no? notify parent
(3)  load r2, (r0)         ; yes? allow load to proceed as usual
 
The speed of an isolated load or store depends upon the complexity and 
length of the check code.   To reduce the complexity of the check, we 
restrict the domain of the target address to a contiguous segment of mem-
ory.  Thus, in a simple implementation, we need two extra variables to 
either hold fence posts of the segment or base and bounds addresses.  
Figure 3 depicts the use of fence posts, both of which are held in regis-
ters.  Line (1) in Figure 2 expands to lines (1) - (4) in Figure 3.  This tech-





Pseudo code for segment matching.  We compare the address contained in the target 
register (r0), to beginning and end of the segment (contained in rBeginning and rEnd). 
We trap if the target address is not between those two “fence posts”.
 
(1)  compare r0, rBeginning ; r2 < beginning?
(2)  blt illegal            ; yes? illegal access
(3)  compare r0, rEnd       ; r2 > end
(4)  bgt  illegal           ; yes? illegal access
(5)  load r2, (r0)          ; perform load
(6) illegal: 
(7)  trap                   ; notify parent
 
If we no longer require that faults actually be identified, but only guaran-
tee that the target address be valid (but not necessarily the computed one) 








Figure 4 shows the pseudo code for sandboxing.  Within a 




 bits of all addresses, called the segment identifier, are 




 bits of each target address to the seg-
ment identifier we guarantee that the address must be in that segment.  If 
the target address were an illegal address, it would be prevented from 
accessing memory outside of the fault domain.  Notice that this technique 
takes only two instructions.  The first instruction clears the segment iden-
tifier of the target address, and the second instruction sets the segment 
identifier of the target address.  For this technique to be efficient, the 
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masks should be stored in dedicated registers since two load penalties for 




Pseudo code for sandboxing.  We drop the requirement to identify the location of the 
fault.  Line (1) clears the segment identifier of the address contained in r0.  Line (2) sets 
the segment identifier.  Line (3) can now only access addresses within the segment.
(1) r0 = r0 AND rClearSegmentIdentifier ; clear seg identifier
(2) r0 = r0 OR rSetSegmentIdentifier    ; set seg identifier
(3) load r2, (r0)                       ; perform load
 
We still have not addressed several outstanding security problems.  An 
untrusted module could arrange to jump directly to the load and avoid the 
prefix code.  A module could arrange this by using code that detects that 
it is sandboxed, and then arranging a branch to skip over the check code.  
This problem is solved by reserving both code and data registers, that is, 
disallowing user code to use these registers.  The “data register” is used 
as the target register for every load or store.  The “code register” is used 
as the target register for every indirect branch or jump.  Thus, each load 
or store uses the special data register, which can contain only a valid data 
segment address.  This eliminates a module from containing self-modify-
ing code (on systems that map those pages writable).  However, a module 
could generate code in its heap, static storage, or stack that performs ille-
gal instructions.  Since the special register reserved for indirect branches 
and jumps can contain only a valid address in the code segment, not the 
data segment, a module cannot jump to generated code.
Implicitly, we stated that there are separate “code” and “data” segments.  
It follows that there are also separate data and code “segment setting 
masks”.   All of these masks are stored in reserved registers for fast 
access.  The total reserved register count is 5: one dedicated code register, 
one dedicated data register, one clear segment mask, one set code seg-
ment mask, and one set data segment mask.
The result of reserving 5 registers on a RISC architecture with at least 32 
registers is marginal [wahbe:sfi].  On older CISC architectures, however, 
such as the Intel x86 with only 8 general-purpose registers, the penalty 
might be too great.
A module can be sandboxed at runtime or at compile time.  If the module 
is sandboxed at runtime, then the sandboxer can be highly architecture 
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step (see Section 4.5).   If a module is sandboxed at compile time, the 
runtime must determine if a module is correctly sandboxed.  One method 
uses a verifier to actually check the module and declare it safe or unsafe.  
Another method involves creating a trusted compiler that cryptographi-
cally signs the sandboxed module with a private key.  Since the public 
key of the compiler is known, authentication will only succeed if the 
module has not been modified.  This method is used in the SPIN operat-
ing system [bershad:spin].  
By using public key encryption and a compiler to sandbox a module, it is 
easier to create a more platform-independent sandboxer.  A sandboxer 
created by modifying a compiler also makes it possible to use later opti-




The runtime support primarily provides services for loading untrusted 
modules and making cross domain (RPC) calls.  In addition to executing 
untrusted modules, the runtime code limits access to system calls and 
other resources.  
An untrusted module is assigned a segment of the host’s address space 
and is loaded into that segment.  If an operating supports access to indi-
vidual page permissions, the code pages are marked executable and read-
able, but not writable.  The data pages are marked readable and writable, 
but not executable.  If the module is already sandboxed, it is verified by 
either checking the signature of the compiler or by using a verifier (see 
Section 4.5).  
To catch system calls, the runtime code must use the sandboxer or some 
other mechanism to cause system calls to pass through some procedure 
that can screen access to potentially dangerous functions.
 
3.3 Crossing Fault Domains
 
Due to the cost of process-level context switching traditional RPCs are 
slow.  Our goal is to create RPCs that perform near-optimally.  An opti-
mal RPC would take exactly the amount of time that a regular function 
call takes.
There are three types of fault domain crossings: host to untrusted, 
untrusted to host, and untrusted to untrusted.  
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Host to an untrusted module
 
: the host must set up the reserved sandboxing 
registers, save its own context, restore sandbox context (the special sand-
boxing registers, and the stack pointer), swap stack pointers, possibly 
copy arguments, and call the desired function.  A host may also wish to 
zero out all non-used registers to avoid leaking information from the host 
to the untrusted module.  Upon return the context and stack pointer are 
restored, and the return value is copied if necessary.  In the case of an 
application binary interface (ABI) that allows arguments to be passed in 
registers (and has no recursion), no argument copying is necessary.   
 
Untrusted module to host:
 
  Note that all indirect branches or jumps must be 
to a valid code address within the untrusted module’s segment.  So, to 
jump out of its fault domain, an untrusted module must jump through a 
carefully constructed jump table.  If the CPU on which the system is run-




 jump or branch instruction in which the target address is 
encoded in the instruction itself we can create a “hard coded” jump table.  
The jump table would consist of a series of direct jumps.  At load time, 
the host modifies each jump instruction in the table so that each is hard 
coded to jump to a particular address.  In addition the page that contains 
the jump table is marked unwritable in the host code to the untrusted 
module.  If the CPU does not have a direct jump instruction, however, we 
can employ a special jump table and a special sequence of instructions. 
The basic idea is to place a jump table in an unwritable page somewhere 
in the untrusted module’s valid data segment (see Section 4.3).  We 




We can make several optimizations to sandboxed code.  Special registers 
like the stack pointer (SP) and the frame pointer can be sandboxed once 
for multiple unsafe instructions before a control transfer.  The sandboxer 
can verify that loads from only small (valid) offsets from the SP are 
made, and thus safely sandbox the SP once at the beginning of a function.
Often CPUs provide indexed addressing modes.  The indexes are usually 
limited to small ranges, like 16 bits.  Compilers often use indexed 
addressing modes for accessing arrays in loops and for accessing ele-
ments from a known reference register (e.g. the SP).  If we place guard 
pages (pages marked not readable, writable, or executable) the size of the 
index range at the beginning and end of each of our data and code seg-
ments, we only have to sandbox the base address (as opposed to the 














We must verify that an untrusted module is sandboxed before we execute 
it.  There are two main methods for verifying a module.  If we sandbox 
untrusted modules at compile time we must either build a separate appli-
cation which analyzes the module, or use a trusted compiler  that crypto-
graphically signs an untrusted module after it has finished.  At load time, 
we simply verify the signature of the compiler and execute the module.




The current implementation of our software-based fault isolation system 
is designed for the DEC Alpha under Digital Unix 3.2 (formerly OSF).  
The primary goal of this design is to explore the possibility of a portable 
sandboxer and runtime.  We implemented two versions.  The first sand-
boxes the intermediate language representation (used by the GCC, the 
Gnu C Compiler) of a module [stallman:gcc].  This version works for 
much common code; for a complete solution, we found it necessary to 
modify the Alpha-specific code generator of GCC.
 
4.1 Sandboxing Using RTL
 
The first sandboxer is a modified form of GCC.  We added sandboxing as 
the first “optimization” pass on the intermediate translated form (RTL, 
register transfer language).  Since RTL is designed to be architecture neu-
tral, our hope is that this sandboxer can be easily ported to other architec-
tures.
GCC is the compiler created and distributed by the Free Software Foun-
dation.  It is designed to execute on many platforms and compile many 
languages to binaries on multiple target platforms and architectures.  It is 
primarily used on UNIX and UNIX-derivative platforms, but also runs 
under Windows and MacOS.  By choosing GCC as the sandboxer, we are 
limiting our sandboxer to platforms on which GCC runs and to any lan-
guage front end which is written for GCC.  There are many such plat-
forms, however, so it is more portable than a binary-code or assembly-
code patcher.
GCC translates a source file to RTL on a function-by-function basis. 
Next, multiple optimization passes run on the RTL such as code motion 
 
Implementation








and loop unrolling.  We view sandboxing as a special “optimizer”, which 
actually outputs slower (but safer) RTL.  Since the sandboxing tech-
niques we described are language and (in general) architecture neutral, 
we can sandbox at the intermediate language level of compilation.  
There are two main pieces to the sandboxing code. First we must arrange 
for the reservation of the special sandboxing registers.  Second, we must 





We need to reserve the five dedicated registers used in sandboxing.  Since 
GCC is retargetable to many platforms, it contains no register quantity 
dependencies.  We needed only to set a mask indicating the desired regis-
ters.
 
4.1.2  Augmenting Register Transfer Language
 
The sandboxing optimizer pass executes directly after a function is trans-
lated to RTL.  RTL is the intermediate language upon which all optimiza-
tions (except peephole optimizers)  occur.
The following is excerpted from the GCC Manual [stallman:gcc]:
 
Most of the work of the compiler is done on an intermediate representation 
called register transfer language.  In this language, the instructions to be out-
put are described, pretty much one by one, in an algebraic form that describes 
what the instruction does.
RTL is inspired by Lisp lists.  It has both an internal form, made up of struc-
tures that point at other structures, and a textual form that is used in the 
machine description and in printed debugging dumps.  The textual form uses 
nested parentheses to indicate the pointers in the internal form.
 
RTL assumes an infinite number of pseudo (or virtual) registers.  Register 
assignment is performed as an optimization pass.  Analysis is performed 
to assign a hard register or a “stack slot” (i.e. allocated from the local 
variable space on the stack) to each pseudo-register. 




 (RTX).  The operator is followed by a 




.  A machine mode indicates the size of 
the data and the representation used for it.  In Figure 5 the indicated 




”, which means double integer.  A double integer is 
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ally “affect” any registers or memory.  In order to actually change state, a 









An RTL Expression (RTX) whose value is the bitwise and of the contents of pseudo-
register 74 and the constant -1.  Because of the machine mode (DI), the constant -1 will 
be treated as an 8-byte two’s complement number (0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF).




The use of the set operator in RTL.  Pseudo-register 75 is assigned the value of the 
bitwise AND of the value of pseudo-register 74 and -1.
(set (reg:DI 75) (and:DI (reg:DI 74) (const_int -1)))
 
To sandbox a function, we must first determine which expressions need 
to be sandboxed.  Since we are sandboxing loads, stores, and indirect 
branches and jumps, we must look for expressions that access memory.  




 operator returns an address 
based on its operand.  The expression in Figure 7 sets the value at the 
address contained in pseudo-register 74 to -1.




 and an 
 
or.  In Figure 8, a 
sequence of expressions shows a sandboxed store.
FIGURE 7. A store and a load
(set (mem:DI (reg:DI 74)) 
 (const_int -1))
(set (reg:DI 74) 
 (mem:DI (reg:DI 74)))
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FIGURE 8. A sandboxed store.  The first expression sets the segment identifier, the second 
expression sets the data segment identifier.  The third instruction is the store (which now 
cannot access any address outside the data segment).
(set (reg:DI $kDedDataReg)
 (and:DI (reg:DI 74) (reg:DI $kDedClearSegReg))
(set (reg:DI $kDedDataReg)
 (ior:DI (reg:DI 74) (reg:DI $kDedDataSetSegReg))
(set (mem:DI (reg:DI 74)) (const_int -1))
4.1.3 Problems with Sandboxing and RTL
We encountered two problems with sandboxing RTL.  First, target 
addresses of RTL mem expressions can be system (GCC) dependent.  Sec-
ond, various system imposed runtime requirements are not visible in 
RTL.
The target address of an RTX is often a simple reg, or an expression 
which represents “register + offset” addressing (See Figure 9).  However, 
to optimize for addressing modes, the RTL generated for some target 
addresses on an Alpha are non-standard.  Figure 10 depicts a valid mem-
ory reference which has no meaning outside of the Alpha machine 
description.  Our normal tactic would move the target address into one of 
the dedicated sandboxing registers, and then proceed to sandbox the 
address.  Unfortunately, since this expression can only be translated as a 
target address of a mem expression, the code generator fails.
FIGURE 9. A typical mem RTX which uses offset addressing
(mem:DI (plus:DI (reg:DI 74)
  (const_int 4))
FIGURE 10. A mem RTX which uses a non-standard target address.
(mem:DI (and:DI (plus:DI (reg:DI 74)
  (const_int 4)) (const_int 8))
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Runtime imposed constraints, such as function prologues, function epi-
logues, and global constant loading are not expressed in RTL.  For each 
function, the prologue and epilogue code is automatically generated by 
an architecture dependent file.  No function epilogue RTL code is ever 
seen by our sandboxing optimizer.  Thus, we can never sandbox the 
frame or stack pointers in the prologue (or epilogue).  Also, according the 
the Digital Unix Application Binary Interface, for each global (as 
opposed to static) function call, the program needs to load certain values 
from a global offset table (a runtime specific global table).  This sequence 
includes several loads from memory that are never represented in RTL 
code.
To address these problems, we augment machine description files.
4.1.4 Sandboxing Using Machine Description Files
GCC is retargetable to many platforms by using machine description files 
for each system.  A machine description file is a series of rules.  A rule 
corresponds to one or many low level virtual instructions defined by 
GCC.  For example, one instruction is “movsi”.  The rule for “movsi”  
describes how to move a single integer (for many sources and destina-
tions). A rule can either be a series of system dependent assembly 
instructions or a series of RTL functions.  Figure 11 shows a “nop” rule 
for the Alpha.
FIGURE 11. A nop instruction from the Alpha machine description file.  This defines the internal GCC 
instruction “nop” as the Alpha instruction “bis $31,$31,$31”.
(define_insn "nop"
  [(const_int 0)]
  ""
  "bis $31,$31,$31"
  [(set_attr "type" "iaddlog")])
We only need to modify the load, store, and jump GCC pseudo instruc-
tions to include sandboxing.  Figure 12 shows the original and modified 
rules for a load. A machine-description also includes the various func-
tions for creating function prologues and epilogues.  It is a matter of sim-
ply adding the sandboxing code, as we did for stores.
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FIGURE 12. The first rule describes how to move from memory to a register.  The %0 and %1 
operators get replaced with the actual address and target registers, respectively.  In the 
second rule, the sequence has been modified to include sandboxing code.  (The code 
shown here has been simplified).  Thus, for each move from memory to register both 
sandboxing and loading code will be generated.
(define_insn "movdi"
  [(set (match_operand:DI 0 "general_operand" "r")
        (match_operand:DI 1 "input_operand" "m"))]
  "register_operand (operands[0], DImode)
   || reg_or_0_operand (operands[1], DImode)"
  "ldq %1, (%0)”)
(define_insn "movdi"
  [(set (match_operand:DI 0 "general_operand" "r")
        (match_operand:DI 1 "input_operand" "m"))]
  "register_operand (operands[0], DImode)
   || reg_or_0_operand (operands[1], DImode)"
  "and %0,       $kClearSegReg, $kDedDataReg \;
   bis $kDedReg, $kSetSegReg,   $kDedDataReg \;
   ldq %1,       ($kDedReg)”)
4.2 Runtime Support
As we discussed in Section 4.2 the runtime provides all of the “operating 
system” services for the software fault domain. It is the most system 
dependent piece of the fault-isolation system.  There are two main pieces 
to the runtime.  First, we need a method to trap system calls and modify 
an untrusted module’s memory.  Our solution uses the “/proc” file sys-
tem [dig:proc, sgi:proc].  The /proc file system provides exclusive 
access to an untrusted module’s memory, and also allows the trapping of 
its system calls. We leverage our system on top of the system runtime 
shared object services (i.e., shared libraries).  Second, we need to verify 
and load a module, potentially resolve symbols (i.e., runtime symbol 
binding), and set up the sandboxing context for an untrusted module. We 
use the system shared library loader (loader).
4.2.1 Loading an Untrusted Module
Before actually loading an untrusted module, we authenticate its creator.  
By checking the signature we can determine if our trusted linker and 
compiler was used.  If we cannot authenticate an untrusted module it is 
not permitted to execute.
Implementation
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To leverage off of system components we use system loader libraries to 
load shared libraries.  This does not give us as much flexibility or fine 
grained control over where the module is loaded, but it does mean we 
need not handle relocation ourselves.  We still need to know where the 
code and data sections are mapped.
To determine the location of the code and data segments we use a  
“secure” linker (i.e., one that signs), to place runtime object code before 
and after the user module.  The piece of object code that prefixes the user 
module contains the unsandboxed RPC stubs (see below), and two 
marker symbol pairs.  One symbol pair is a start and end data symbol, the 
other is a start and end code symbol.  By finding the addresses of these 
symbols at runtime, after the loader maps the object, we can find the start 
of the code and data sections. See Figure 13. 
The suffix object code also includes a static heap (see Figure 13).  We 
make this heap large, for it will also contain the untrusted module’s stack.   
A third marker contains the size of and location of the heap.  Under Digi-
tal UNIX, an unusually large data area will not cause any of the corre-
sponding pages to be mapped until they are touched.  Once the heap is 
setup, the last step is to setup the stack.  Currently the stack starts at the 
end of the static heap. 
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Implementation and Analysis of Software Based Fault Isolation 17 of 32
FIGURE 13. The text in quotes represents symbols whose addresses resolve to the beginning and 
end of each segment and also identify the malloc heap (and stack).
4.2.2 Crossing Fault Domains 
Host to Untrusted Module
First, the called function must be resolved to the untrusted module.  We 
use a simple interface to the Alpha shared library loader to determine the 
location of a function (by name).  Even though the current implementa-
tion actually tries to find the symbol each time, this clearly can be per-
formed one at run time.  If we have a stub for each function called, then 
the function address can be filled in by the loader itself, instead of our 
doing it by hand.  Since stubs are currently generated by hand, however, 
we did not make this optimization.
To call a function in the untrusted module, in addition to normal function 
call register saving, the sandbox register context must be restored, stack 
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untrusted module’s stack, and a jump to the actual function.  On a DEC 
Alpha this adds 10 extra instructions (ignoring the copying of parame-
ters, which is one store per parameter) to the normal procedure call cost.  
Upon return, in addition to the normal function return and register resto-
ration, we need only swap the stack pointer and copy arguments not 
passed into registers back into their stack slots on the host stack.  We do 
not need to save the untrusted modules register context, because those 
registers are inaccessible to it.
Untrusted Module to Host
The control transfer from untrusted module to host is trickier because the 
target of the jump or branch instruction will lie outside of its code seg-
ment.  If direct branches and jumps are available the technique described 
in Section 4.3 can be used.  Unfortunately many platforms that support 
direct addressing limit the number of bits available for the direct jump 
(because it is assembled into the instruction), thus limiting the distance in 
memory of the RPC sending stub from the target RPC receiving stub 
[may:powerpc].  To gain the full range of addressable memory on a given 
CPU or if the given CPU does not support direct jumps or branches, 
another technique is necessary.
The technique has two pieces.  First, we require a jump table.  The table 
must be located in a page mapped readable, but not writable or execut-
able, in the untrusted module’s data segment.  (We can drop the not exe-
cutable requirement by insisting that any data in the table not be an 
unsafe instruction.)  The second part is a special code sequence which 
prevents a rogue module from using the table load to jump to an illegal 
address.  We call this sequence of code Escape, and the jump table the 
EscapeTable.
There are four functions that make up an untrusted-to-host RPC: the 
untrusted stub, the code that loads from the jump table and jumps to the 
host stub, the host stub, and the host procedure.  Figure 15 shows an 
overview of the process.  
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FIGURE 14. Overview of an untrusted to host RPC.  This demonstrates the RPC to call a function 
called “call back 2”.  The steps are labelled in order of execution.  Step 1, a function 
called main in the untrusted module calls the untrusted stub 2. Step 2, the stub calls the 
correct Escape function.  Step 3, the correct escape sequence loads the address of 
trusted stub 2, and jumps to it (Step 4).  The control transfer is complete at step 5.  At 
Step 5, arguments are copied on to the host stack, and the stack pointers are swapped.  
Step 6, the function call back 2 is executed.
The untrusted stub jumps (step 1) to a particular place in Escape, which 
loads (step 2) a value as a known offset into the EscapeTable, and then 
jumps to that address (step 3).  If we simply performed a load and a jump 
through any (non dedicated) register, a rogue module could place an ille-
gal address in the target register of the jump instruction and skip the load, 
and therefore jump to an illegal address.  If the target register of the jump 
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jump to an illegal address if the rogue module skips the load and starts at 
line (3) in Figure 15.  This sequence is illustrated in Figure 14.  However, 
it is still not safe.  If the untrusted module starts at (2), we will load the 
value of an assembled instruction into rCode, and jump there.  
FIGURE 15. Simple version of Escape.  This is a DEC Alpha assembly sequence for loading an entry 
from the table and jumping to it.  kOffs0 is a constant whose value is the index of the stub 
entry in the table.  We use the rCode register (the special register reserved for indirect 
jumps) to avoid jumping to an address, other than the desired address, outside of this 
fault domain.  This version is still not safe.  If the module jumps directly to (2), we will 
jump to whatever address happens to the assembled value of the instruction at rCode.
(1) lda rCode, kOffs0(EscapeTable); load address of entry
(2) ldq rCode, (rCode)            ; load address from jump table
(3) jmp rZero, (rCode)           ; jump to the stub 
To address the problems of the simple version, we use the sequence 
depicted in Figure 16.  We can prove that the indirect jump in line (7) will 
only exit the fault domain to an address in the untrusted module’s code 
segment or an address listed in the EscapeTable.  First, we know that 
upon entry to any line in Escape we know that rCode contains some 
valid code address and rData contains some valid data address.  The cor-
rect path is to start at line (1) and in line (7) we will jump to the stub 
address as in Figure 15.  
If we start at (2), rData could contain any valid data address.  Thus 
rCode will be loaded with a potentially illegal value.  In lines (3) and (4), 
however, we try to load the same table entry as in (1) and (2).  Since 
rData will now contain the address of the stub, only two things can hap-
pen in the compare sequence in lines (5) and (6).  First, in (6) we take the 
branch, then rData is not equal to rCode, thus the untrusted module must 
have skipped line (1), resulting in a trap.  If we do not take the branch, 
thus rData equals rCode.  Since rData must contain the stub address, the 
jump in (7) will give us the desired result.
If we start at (3), in order to take the branch in (6), rCode must already 
contain the value which will be loaded from the table in (4).  Thus, rCode 
will contain desired stub address.
If we start in (4), rCode must equal the value at address rData if we take 
the jump in (7); since, rCode is in the untrusted module’s code segment, 
this does not succeed in jumping to an illegal destination.
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If we start in (5), rCode must equal rData in order to take the jump in 
(7).  Again, rCode must be a location within the untrusted module’s code 
segment.
If we start in (6), rData will equal 0 in order to take the jump in (7).  
Again, since we know rCode will be a valid code address, line (7) will 
jump somewhere valid in the module’s code space.
If we start in (7), rCode must contain some valid code address, thus we 
will just jump to a valid code address in the module’s segment.
Since we used rData as our target registers for the loads, we guarantee 
that no loads will take place out of the valid data section.
Thus, the escape code is robust, i.e., the untrusted module may only jump 
to a designated exit point (listed in the EscapeTable) or to some location 
in its own code segment.
The current implementation stores the table in the code segment, and not 
in the data segment.  This way we know that the segment is not writable.  
In order to guarantee that the untrusted module cannot jump to an entry in 
the table and perform an illegal operation, we require that no entry con-
tains an invalid instruction.  
FIGURE 16. A robust version of Escape.  See the text for full explanation.  This code is not the one 
actually used, since we need to deal with some Alpha runtime issues (like gp and pv).  
Those details were eliminated for clarity. kOffs0 is a constant whose value is 0.  rZero is 
the zero register on the Alpha.  rCode is the dedicated code register.  rData is the 
dedicated data register.
(1)   lda  rData, kOffs0(EscapeTable)  ; load address of entry
(2)   ldq  rCode, (rData)              ; rCode = stub address
(3)   lda  rData, kOffs0(EscapeTable)  ; load address of entry
(4)   ldq  rData, (rData)              ; rData = stub address
(5)   subq rData, rCode, rData         ; rData = rData - rCode
(6)   bne  rData, illegal              ; if (!rData) illegal
(7)   jmp  rZero, (rCode)              ; else, jump away
(8) illegal:
(9)   trap                             ; do trap stuff here
4.2.3 /proc and Modifying Untrusted Modules
The “/proc” file system (or procfs) allows processes to be manipulated 
as files.  It enables processes with the correct permissions to control the 
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behavior of victim process.  An entry in the “/proc” directory is created 
for each valid process.  The file is treated like any standard file, and 
manipulated using open, close, write, ioctl, etc.  The functions that 
actually read and write data to the file give access to the processes’s 
memory.  The first address of the processes’s memory corresponds to the 
first byte in the file.
Procfs provides various other services to the controlling process through 
the use of ioctl.  For example, we can stop a process, cause a process to 
run again, or stop a process from calling a set of system calls.  Fortu-
nately the procfs is available under Digital Unix, IRIX, BSD, and 
Linux.  Since procfs provides a somewhat general interface to the pro-
cess, we can duplicate its structure (the parts we need) on platforms that 
do not yet support procfs (e.g., AIX).  
We use procfs to fill in the EscapeTable (see Section 4.3) with the vari-
ous addresses of the callbacks.  This is quite simple using procfs.  We 
simply lseek to the base address of the table, and write the addresses of 
the trusted stubs into the table.
To trap system calls, we use the procfs to ask the operating system to 
stop on a set of system calls for the process or thread executing the 
untrusted module.  The host supplies a mask (a large mask) specifying 
which systems calls for a particular module should be trapped.  Ideally, 
the host would supply a table of replacement routines for the replaced 
system calls.  Our current implementation, however, does not replace any 
system calls, but faults if the module makes any unsafe system calls.  In 
future versions a replacement set of system calls will be associated with 
each untrusted module context.
4.2.4 /proc, the Untrusted Module Database and Software Structure
The procfs requires either a threaded or a two process software design.  
To stop (and resume) a thread or process, another process (called the 
monitor) or thread must be able to wake it up.  We chose a two process 
design for expediency (there was example code available).  At start-up a 
host that wishes to load untrusted modules calls a library function that 
forks off a process that subsequently opens the procfs file for the host 
process.  This file is opened with the permission “O_EXCL” which means 
that only one process can have a file descriptor to the file for that process 
(so that the untrusted module cannot modify itself). We call the process 
opened the victim.  Thus, the host (and its loaded untrusted module) is 
the victim.  We create two communication channels between the victim 
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and the monitor.  The first is a pipe (which is faked to be bidirectional, 
by using two pipes), and the second is a shared memory area.  The shared 
memory area is the central database where all the current information 
about an untrusted module is stored.  Concurrent write access to the data 
base is controlled using messages communicated over the pipe.  We 
chose not to use semaphores for expediency.  The current software allows 
for only one possible writer to the database.  This will need to be changed 
in the event of a threaded model.
Figure 17 shows the architecture of the complete system.  The monitor 
process waits for activity on the file descriptor attached to the communi-
cation pipe or the descriptor attached to the monitor process (using the 
poll system call, which actually blocks).  The victim can send 4 different 
messages to the monitor:  new untrusted module, unlock database, 
lock database, and shutdown.
FIGURE 17. The Architecture of the Software Based Fault Isolation System
The “new untrusted module” message is sent to the monitor when a 
new module has been loaded into memory and placed in the database.  
Included in this message is the address of the EscapeTable.  Next, the 
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“Lock database” and “unlock database” messages are sent to guaran-
tee exclusive access to the database.  These can be used to modify the 
database and avoid race conditions. 
The “shutdown” message is sent when the host terminates.  Any cleanup 
should be performed.  Currently no cleanup is necessary.
5.0 Performance
To evaluate the performance of software-enforced fault isolation we used 
our prototype system on a 133Mhz DEC Alpha 3000 300X running Digi-
tal Unix 3.2.  We evaluate the speed of our RPC mechanism, and deter-
mine the cost of fault isolation on various benchmarks.
5.1 Sandboxing Overhead
We measured the execution times and self-reported values (such as 
FLOPS) for various benchmarks.  We treated each benchmark as an 
untrusted module, and sandboxed all of its code. Table 1 shows the 
changes in execution time and benchmark value.  We use non-sandboxed 
code as the baseline performance. The overhead of register reservation 
(recall the five dedicated registers) and the overhead of the additional 
sandboxing instructions is reported.   The value for sandboxing overhead 
includes the the reserved register overhead.  Positive values indicate that 
the benchmark ran slower. In general, floating point benchmarks slowed 
down less than integer benchmarks.  We used Al Aburto’s set of widely 
used benchmarks [aburto:bench].
Table 1 contains various anomalies.  For example, flops1 reports that 
the sandboxed version was actually 7.58% faster than non-sandboxed 
code.  In many cases the code with a reduced register executed faster than 
the normal code.  In each of these cases the result was nominal and not 
statistically significant.  Notice that register reservation overhead is about 
2-3%, however, while sandboxing overhead is about 20 - 30% (though as 
low as 1%).
The benchmarks we tested used little or no I/O.  The more I/O an applica-
tion uses, in general, the lower the cost of sandboxing.
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TABLE 1. Sandboxing and Register Reservation Overhead.  Column 1 indicates the name and 
type of the benchmark.  An “int” designates a primarily integer-based benchmark.  An “fp” 
designates a primarily floating point-based benchmark.  Columns 2 and 3 compares the 
performance of each benchmark compiled without the use of the dedicated sandboxing 
registers to the performance of the benchmark normally compiled.  Positive values 
indicate slower performance.  A “benchmark value” is the self-reported value.  For 
example, the flops benchmark reports “FLOPS” or floating point operations per second.  
Columns 3 and 4 indicate the performance of benchmarks compiled with the sandboxing 
registers reserved and the sandboxing code inserted.
5.2 Cross Fault Domain Performance
We measured the performance of host-to-untrusted-module RPCs, and 
untrusted-module-to-host RPCs.  Each RPC took no arguments and 
returned no value.  For comparison, we compared the execution time for 
void function calls determined by Wahbe, et al [wahbe:sfi].  Function 
performance performance provides a lower bound on the performance of 
an RPC.  In addition, we timed the round trip cost of sending a byte 
between two processes using the pipe mechanism.  Table 2 shows the 
benchmark reserved register overhead sandboxing overhead








c4 int 4.68 4.88 35.1 68.6
dhry1 int 0.361 0.33 29.6 42.0
dhry2 int 32.6 20.1 30.8 23.3
fft fp 0.359 0.894
flops1 fp 0.956 -0.327 -7.58 1.85
flops2 fp 0.277 1.70
flops3 fp 0.147 1.90
flops4 fp 0.005 2.50
hanoi int -0.514 -0.797 39.2 18.1
heapsort int 5.44 7.03 16.6 55.3
clinpack1 fp -1.69 -0.714 24.2 27.9
clinpack2 fp 2.34 2.45 29.1 32.5
clinpack3 fp 0.316 0.291 26.0 31.0
clinpack4 fp -0.551 0.794 27.6 33.7
mm1 fp 0.00 0.00 35.7 34.0
mm2 fp 0.00 -2.68 20.0 22.5
mm3 fp 9.91 10.9 27.3 29.4
mm4 fp 0.00 -6.91 42.9 26.8
nsieve int 3.53 27.9
queens int 1.07 38.2
tfftdp fp -2.06 -2.03 0.155 0.0103
average 2.90 2.13 21.2 28.6
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results of our experiments.  Notice that our RPCs are 2 orders of magni-
tude faster than the byte sending test.  This is due to our extremely inex-
pensive context switches, conservative register saving, and no traps into 
the kernel.
We attribute the difference in costs between the two RPCs in Columns 1 
and 2 to our implementation.  In a future implementation this cost would 
be equal.  
TABLE 2. RPC Performance.  Column 1 indicates the cost of a C procedure call with no 
parameters and no return value.  Column 2 shows the cost of host-to-untrusted-module 
RPC.  Column 3 shows the cost of an untrusted-to-host-module RPC.  Column 3 shows 
the cost of sending a byte round trip between two processes using the pipe mechanism.
6.0 Limitations, and future directions
6.1 Current System Limitations
The current system does not perform any verification or authentication of 
untrusted modules.  To sign modules, we need to augment our trusted 
compiler to use a public key encryption system such as pgp 
[garfinkel:pgp]. 
The method of using procfs to trap system calls requires an extra con-
text switch for each system call.  This is not necessary if we modify the 
untrusted module to call RPCs in place of system calls.  The RPCs would 
call trusted code which would replicate many of the (permitted) system 
call services.
We have not performed any of the optimizations described in Section 4.4.  
In order to perform the “guard page” optimization we probably need to 
implement our own “loader” untrusted modules.  As previously 
described, using the system loader does not give us the fine grained con-
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6.2 Future Directions
The current system only executes on an Alpha running Digital Unix.  The 
system should be ported to other platforms to determine the system’s 
portability.  An Alpha runtime verifier should be created to determine the 
start-up costs of loading a module.  In the case of a network module (such 
as a Java Applet), its purpose may be to execute a short piece of code and 
terminate.  An large start-up time might outweigh the use of a runtime 
verifier. 
Although we demonstrated a prototype system that can execute untrusted 
modules, we have not shown a full application of the technology.  We 
suggest three types of applications:  (1) an extensible kernel such as 
SPIN, but using sandboxed untrusted modules to insulate the kernel from 
the modules, (2) applications like Adobe Photoshop or Netscape Naviga-
tor that load modules to handle different types of data on single address 
space operating systems such as the MacOS, (3) extensible applications, 
such as databases, which require user modules to handle user defined 
types (on UNIX-type operating systems).
7.0 Related Work
Much of the original theory presented in this paper was created by Robert 
Wahbe, et. al. in their paper [wahbe:sfi].  
Many researchers have tried to increase RPC performance [bershad:lrpc, 
birrel:rpc].  RPCs are bound by the hardware limit of two context 
switches, and two kernel traps.  Implementations such as LRPC have 
approached the hardware limit, thus suggesting another method for per-
forming RPC [bershad:lrpc].
Some operating systems use type safe languages, trusted compilers and 
trusted linkers to make untrusted modules secure [bershad:spin].  For 
example, SPIN uses a type safe language for modules linked into the ker-
nel.  Although this adequately protects the kernel, and provides good per-
formance, it limits the extension of the operating system to languages not 
normally used for operating system development (such as Modula-3).  In 
addition, many other researchers are working on extensible operating 
systems [osdi:panel, engler:exokernel, seltzer:case].
The Omniware system compiles source files to its own Omniware virtual 
machine (OmniwareVM) and runtime [colusa:omniware, adl-t:omnimo-
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bile].  When the compiled objects need to be executed, they are translated 
to native platform objects with inserted sandboxing checks to provide 
fault isolation.  They report that sandboxed code runs on average 9% 
slower than non-sandboxed code (although they do not sandbox loads).
8.0 Conclusion
We described a system for software-based fault isolation.  This method 
creates logical fault domains within a single address space.  By using a 
single address space, RPCs between fault domains are extremely fast 
because they are not bound by context switch time.  In addition software 
fault isolation provides a method for creating multiple address spaces 
under operating systems that support only a single address space.
To protect memory outside of an untrusted module’s logical fault domain 
we used a technique called sandboxing was used.  This technique aug-
ments the code of an untrusted module so that a module can only access 
memory within its own fault domain.  To exit its fault domain the 
untrusted module makes a relatively inexpensive RPC.  The runtime 
overhead for sandboxing an untrusted module is approximately 30% on a 
DEC Alpha.  For frequently communicating modules or applications that 
perform large amounts of I/O the cost of sandboxing decreases (because 
for inter-process communication, context switch time take the majority of 
time), thus making it an attractive solution.  In situations, such as a ker-
nel, where only one address space is available, software-based fault isola-
tion provides near native speeds for untrusted modules without 
decreasing kernel reliability.
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